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About 
 
Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
www.gdnet.org 
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – Understanding Reform 
Introduction 
Bosnia- Herzegovina's (BiH) recent economic environment and development priorities 
have been primarily determined by the requirements of post- war reconstruction, following 
an end of a three and a half year war in 1995. Reforms towards creation of free- market 
economy were identified as medium- term priority, once the basic infrastructure and 
institutional prerequisites for the normalization of economic activity were in place. Besides 
war- related, large- scale physical and institutional destruction against which transition 
process was launched, its unique character was determined by the fact that it took place 
within the framework of building BiH as an independent and highly decentralized political 
entity. With a minimum of state- level economic prerogatives, transition reforms in post- 
Dayton BiH were pursued with variable speed and in certain respects modified contents by 
its two entities i.e. the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska, which has had important 
repercussions on the overall profile, sequencing, success and shortcomings of the 
process. Another important difference compared to the transition experience elsewhere is 
the decisive role played by the external actors in the economic management of the country 
by way of setting up economic policy and reform agendas (the High Representative is 
effectively the supreme authority), and providing financial and expert support for its 
implementation. The international community has taken over the policy processes in many 
key reform areas: from fiscal and monetary to the regulation of telecommunications and 
reforms of judiciary, rendering local leadership rather a subordinate role. This gives a 
qualitatively different meaning to the crucial issues of political consensus over the reforms 
and hence ownership of reforms, which, as the transition experience of other countries 
suggests, is key to the sustainability of reforms and their impact on economic performance. 
While local consensus on reform issues was often achieved by resorting to aid 
conditionality, it is the obstacles in the process of implementation that testified to the lack of 
genuine local commitment, thus affecting profoundly the dynamics and the outcome of the 
reform processes. Another important difference relevant for understanding BiH's transition 
experience is an exceptionally high level of international assistance. While facilitating and 
sustaining reform processes, it has resulted in an aid dependent pattern of development 
reflected in a fact that eight years after the end of the conflict international community still 
remains the main service provider in key governance areas. This is an important fact that 
has to be taken into account in the course of analysis of the experience of transition in BiH 
and a telling indicator of its outcome in terms of developing a functioning market economy 
in the specific environment of BiH.. And last among the specific features of BiH's transition 
context is a short, 2-year political cycle characteristic of most of the period since the end of 
the war in 1995. The delays in constituting governments at various levels and a lack of 
constructive political dialogue among the parties represented in the government has also 
had a strong impact on the final shape of reform measures and dynamics of their 2 
implementation by rekindling instability and uncertainty. The other aggravating factor was 
the succession of coalition governments with weak executive power.  
 
Macroeconomic stability has been the cornerstone of the economic programme pursued 
as part of a broader reconstruction effort in BiH supported by the international community. 
In contrast to many transition countries that similarly aimed at macroeconomic stability as 
an early key objective of transition,  BiH has had a relatively coherent stabilization 
programme the implementation of which was facilitated by substantial international 
financial and technical assistance. The key element was the consistent and strict 
implementation of the currency board regime coupled with the public finance reform and 
the reform of the financial system. The currency board regime, which was initially 
envisaged to last until 2003, was extended due to ongoing political risks. Because of strong 
international presence in BiH some o f the reforms were pursued more vigorously e.g. 
financial liberalization and others e.g. labour market reforms initiated at an earlier stage 
compared to experience of most other countries. Political obstructions to the 
implementation of the reforms have made the problem of sequencing and reform inter-
locking even more pronounced, which in turn diminished some of their positive effects. The 
"second generation" reforms were stepped up towards the end of 2002 while some of the 
"first generation" reforms, notably privatization, were still far from being completed. At this 
stage reforms had to be carried forward in a somewhat different economic environment. 
Economic recovery spurred by international assistance was clearly running out of steam 
and the level of international assistance had fallen sharply. At the end of 2003 the BiH 
government adopted Development Strategy as part of the poverty reduction strategy 
exercise, which was the first document involving broad consultations among local 
stakeholders over the country's economic priorities. The international assistance 
conditionality moved more firmly towards European Union accession agenda whereby the 
implementation of a number of reforms was made a condition for BiH signing Stabilization 
and Association Agreement. International community signaled with greater determination 
its intention to scale down its involvement and transfer responsibility onto local authorities. 
All this presents a new challenge in managing transition in BiH since local political 
environment remains one of the main constraints to the implementation of remaining 
complex reform agenda. 
 
This paper starts with a brief overview of the initial conditions and the framework within 
which the reforms in BiH were initiated. It then highlights some of the key elements of BiH's 
new administrative set up of crucial relevance for the analysis of reform experience, 
pointing to the specific role assigned to the international actors under the terms of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. The third part examines the contents and problems of 
implementation of some of the key sectoral reforms focusing on the institutional 
constraints. Problems, obstacles and failures of the reform process in the selected areas 
are then taken up and analysed in the fourth part. In part five the current status of reforms 3 
in summarized. Part six concludes by looking into the state of BiH's economy in a 
comparative perspective within the region of South East Europe and identifies some of the 
major areas affecting its progress towards self- sustained growth.  
 
 
1  Initial conditions and beginning of reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
BiH's transition started in conditions of large- scale physical destruction, massive 
population displacement and dissolution of the system of governance established while 
BiH was one of the republics of SFR Yugoslavia. Although difficult to determine with any 
precision, direct economic losses of the 1992-1995 war, not including lost output, were 
estimated at $60-$80bn. Pre- war economy collapsed; at the beginning of 1996, BiH's 
GDP stood at some 20% of its 1991 level, amounting to $500 in per capita terms
1. The 
decline in industrial output to 5% of its pre- war level and the rate of unemployment 
estimated at 70-80% with most job losses in industry indicated not only the extent of war 
destruction but also the scale of deindustrialization that the country had undergone and 
was unlikely to reverse to any significant degree. Worst still was the impact on agriculture, 
which virtually ceased. With an average salary of DEM90, a nd paid irregularly, most 
people survived on humanitarian aid. Large scale internal and external migration, 
accounting for over a half of the pre- war population, against the change in the country's 
economic structure, contributed further to previously already serious problems of labour 
market rigidity. All this would prove an enormous challenge to efforts aimed at reviving 
economy while maintaining macroeconomic stability and pursuing economic reforms. 
Facilitating factor at the initial stage was that rampant inflation of early 1990s was brought 
under control in larger part of the country. Stabilization programme in the parts of BiH with 
Bosniac and Croat majority, involving introduction of a new currency and use of Croatian 
kuna, respectively, and sanctions on Republika Srpska by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia contributed to the improvement in fiscal discipline towards the end of the war.
2 
However, the governments in both entities ran large arrears in payments towards 
pensions, army and other budget beneficiaries as well as to the public in respect of frozen 
foreign currency savings, which combined with large external debt meant that the overall 
public debt was very high. Foreign debt stood at $3.5bn at the end of 1995, most of which 
was owed to London and Paris Club of creditors and was unserviced during war years. 
Furthermore, BiH was not a member of the World Bank and the IMF. Estimates of exports 
in 1995 ranged between $295m and $90m, the latter figure being probably more realistic. 
Against the country's reduced production capacity, and consequently large imports the 
trade deficit was likely to have been substantial.  
 
                                                                 
1   Source: IMF, unless indicated otherwise. 
2   Inflation continued to be higher in Republika Srpska than in the Federation for much of the post- war period; the rates 
only started to converge in 2000-02. 4 
The institutional heritage of post- war BiH was not conducive to the development of market 
economy and democracy. Administrative control over economy increased during the war, 
strengthening the concept of state enterpreneurship based on totalitarianism of state 
property in companies and banks. It became the very source of bureaucratic management 
over the economy, politicization and socialization of economic relations, political and 
bureaucratic redistribution between economy and state and within economy, coupled with 
an inefficient use of resources, lack of incentives for the expansion of economic 
partnership, etc. Free enterpreneurship had no access to resources, thus undermining the 
efficiency with which resources were used. In actual fact resources were captured by 
national bureaucracies, group-property interests and inertia of the socialist system, and 
largely isolated from the impact o f market forces. Accordingly, institutions that support 
development of free economic initiative were seriously underdeveloped and public trust in 
state institutions was lacking. Another important effect of war was political and economic 
fragmentation of the country, and the establishment of the three more or less self- sufficient 
economic and political entities and an absence of the institutional framework for 
macroeconomic management of the country.  
 
Initial steps towards market reform of the system based on self-management including a 
self-managed type of social property were made in BiH in the pre-war period. Between 
1989-1991 the government of the SFR Yugoslavia introduced an entrepreneurial concept 
of business management in the economy and started privatization. The reform processes 
in BiH were stopped soon after the first multi-party elections in the republics of former 
SFRY, dissolution of the country and the outbreak of war. During the war reforms were not 
only halted but also partly reversed. This e xperience was another factor adding to the 
complexity of the environment in which transition reforms were launched following the 
signing of the peace agreement and BiH's admission to the membership of the World Bank 
and the IMF in 1996. 
 
 
2  Administrative structure of BiH and readiness to implement the reforms  
The Dayton Peace Agreement defined a new state of BiH as a union of two entities: the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). Definition of 
entities and distribution of territories in the ratio of approximately 51% to 49% are primarily 
based on ethnic principle. FBiH is constituted as a Bosniac-Croat entity while the RS is 
constituted as a Serb entity. This domination of ethnic principle in administrative and 
economic arrangements has created numerous problems, particularly regarding the 
possibility of conducting efficient foreign trade, fiscal and social policies, requiring at least 
some degree of state- level policy making. 
 
The established structure of authority in BiH has enabled national elites strong influence in 
deciding whether to implement the reforms or to boycott them. Coordination between the 5 
entities, and in the Federation between the Bosniac-majority and the Croat-majority areas, 
regarding the adoption of strategic laws for implementation of reforms remained very poor 
for most of the 1996-2000. Adopting laws in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly was an 
extremely difficult process, marred by obstructions and frequent rejections of laws. This 
behaviour was particularly evident in the first three post-war years (1996-1998) during 
which institutional structure of BiH failed to provide a minimal framework of legislative, 
executive and judicial authority required for the introduction and implementation of reforms.  
 
To counteract obstructions to the implementation of peace agreement including economic 
reforms the powers of the High Representative were gradually extended. While initially the 
High Representative acted primarily as an intermediary between the entity authorities, 
facilitating consensus on key decisions and laws necessary for the implementation of 
reforms, since 1998 his authority has extended allowing him to impose legislation, if 
necessary. This was deemed necessary because, despite formal agreement among the 
local parties that there was no alternative to the development of modern market institutions 
protecting property rights, executing contractual obligations, and accepting business risks, 
morals and disciplines, obstructions of processes aimed in this direction remained strong.  
 
Given the fact that, in economic sense, during 1995-1998 BiH was practically a virtual 
creation, the necessary laws aimed at creating the conditions for economic integration of 
BiH were either directly imposed by the High Representative or the state parliament 
adopted them under concerted pressure of the High Representative. Although under the 
Dayton Agreement the BiH state is given the responsibility over monetary, customs and 
foreign trade policy, the first state level laws providing a legal basis in this area were 
adopted only in 1998.
3 The application and harmonization of the laws at the entity level 
proceeded slowly as local parties tried to reject or delay moves towards strengthening 
integrative elements contained in the state- level legislation. For example, the BiH Law on 
Foreign Direct Investment was adopted in mid-1998, but the entities codified and adjusted 
their corresponding laws only three or four years later: FBiH in mid-2001 and the RS in 
2002.  
 
Monetary system represents another example of BiH's divided economic space in the first 
post-war years. BiH did not have a single currency until June 1998. Internal payment 
operations system was divided along ethnic lines into three separate systems. Fiscal policy 
was managed at the level of entities and at the cantonal and entity level in the FBiH. 
Budget of the BiH joint institutions did not even exist in 1996 and 1997. The first budget of 
the BiH joint institutions was adopted in 1998, reflecting the peculiarity of BiH's 
constitutional set up, namely that the state had no independent revenues other than the 
                                                                 
3   Law on Customs Tariff of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Law on Foreign Trade Policy, Law on Direct Foreign Investment 
Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Law on Customs Policy of BiH  were adopted in 1998. During the period 
from 1996 to the day of adoption, the laws at the state level did not exist.  6 
fees. According to the Constitution the central state is funded from the transfers by the two 
entities. The most telling indicator of BiH's state lacking a minimum of competence in terms 





3  Contents of reforms and implementation procedure – programme, goals and 
instruments 
3.1 Reconstruction and beginning of reforms  
Rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in BiH, as a material precondition for the initiation 
of economic reforms, were implemented in 1996-2000. Priority reconstruction programme 
aimed primarily at rehabilitation of infrastructure and restoration of public services. By far 
the largest share was invested in the reconstruction of devastated or damaged housing 
units, electricity supply systems, transport and water infrastructure. In the public services 
sector, reconstruction projects were directed into reconstruction of health and educational 
facilities with the aim of restoring basic health services and initiating educational reform at 
all three levels (primary, secondary and university education). The main instruments for the 
realization of these projects were multilateral and bilateral donations.  
 
Table 1 
Sectoral distribution of reconstruction projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995 to 2000 
   S E C T O R S 
 
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 
    in % 
1  Housing construction   16,11 
2  Power supply sector   12,99 
3  Transport  11,18 
4  Water supply system  7,81 
5  Support to social security system  6,84 
6  Education  4,32 
7  Credit lines to the business sector   8,20 
8  Agriculture  3,82 
9  Construction of the state institutions  3,94 
10  Servicing of foreign debt   4,40 
11  Other  20,38 
  T O T A L  100,00 
Source: International Management Group Databases, Summary Report: Donor Aid to BiH, u: Economic Task Force 
Secretariat, Vol. 3, Issue 5. 
 
                                                                 
4   The State Border Service was established only in 2000 by the decision of the High Representative. 7 
Following BiH's admission into the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
membership, economic reforms were included as a compulsory element of the 
internationally assisted reconstruction programme. Unlike in other countries implementing 
reforms, the first step in BiH was to create legal and institutional base for the very process 
itself. This required an agreement with the entity authorities and the High Representative 
for BiH acting as an intermediary. The basic set of economic reforms included the 
following:  
–  fiscal reform; 
–  monetary reform; 
–  privatization; 
–  financial sector reform; 
–  trade liberalization, and 
–  labour market reform. 
 
In its initial stage reforms concentrated on public finance, banking and privatization. The 
goal of the reforms was development of market economy based on private property and 
elimination of the state from the management of the economy. Social protection system 
and labour market reforms were placed within this context. Although the goals of these 
reforms did not differ from most other transition countries, in BiH the task was additionally 
complicated by the necessity to build the whole new institutional framework for 
macroeconomic management as envisaged by the Dayton peace agreement. This has 
had defining impact on the pace and success of economic reforms. 
 
 
3.2   Contents of the sectoral reforms  
3.2.1  Fiscal system reforms   
Defining new fiscal structure was one of the immediate post- war priorities. Significantly 
larger competencies were assigned to the entities than to the state, and the structure of the 
fiscal system in BiH was defined accordingly. As mentioned previously, fiscal sovereignty 
rests with the entities
5, while the state has no revenue rising powers other than the fees 
and is financed by entity transfers.  
 
The Constitution has defined as a minimum condition: (1) establishment of the BiH budget 
and (2) provision of its revenues to cover servicing of the external debt and financing of BiH 
joint institutions. The BiH Constitution provides a possibility for the entities to agree on how 
to regulate the fiscal system. The constitution has not defined a permanent basic fiscal 
model, i.e. division of fiscal sovereignty, neither has it postulated that the fiscal model must 
be modified. This makes it clear that the Constitutional solution was primarily based on 
                                                                 
5   The district of Brcko which is under the jurisdiction of the central state is also fiscally autonomous. 8 
political p rinciples, rather than economic. Given the political situation in BiH, the 
constitutional approach started from the assumption that the fiscal system which places 
fiscal sovereignty with the entities may contribute to the political stabilization and 
confidence building as an initial step in improving relations among BiH's three main ethnic 
groups.  
 
The political structure of BiH is aimed at securing the interests of the constituent peoples, 
which is reflected in the principles underpinning the allocation o f public revenues and 
expenditure. Apart from external debt servicing, which is the responsibility of the central 
state, all other public services are responsibility of the entities. The fact that the central 
state does not have its own independent revenue has come to be one of the major 
obstacles for its functioning as new state level institutions have been created in the course 
of the implementation of the peace agreement eg state border service and new ministries. 
Establishment of the Indirect Tax Administration in 2003 represented the first example of a 
substantial transfer of fiscal sovereignty from the entities to the State. It is a step towards 
the introduction of the state- level value added tax, which is planned in 2005. This example 
shows that a consensus on a rational organization of institutions is possible provided there 
is confidence in their professional and efficient conduct.  
 
Administrative structure of the FBiH, which is composed of ten cantons, places most 
service delivery obligations on t he cantons, without assigning them sufficient revenues. 
Canton are responsible for education, social welfare (except for the war invalids and 
families of killed soldiers), and cantonal administration. Cantons have an exclusive right to 
turnover tax on their respective territories. This source of fiscal revenues for most of the 
post-war period accounted for approximately 75% of the total revenues of cantonal 
budgets. In contrast, three main obligations related to the FBiH budget are payment of 
social benefits to the war invalids and families of killed soldiers, military expenditures and 
servicing of the external debt of BiH allocated to FBiH in accordance with the Law on 
External Debt of BiH. Federation main sources of revenues are customs, excise and taxes. 
Tax policy, which is conducted at the Federation level, has a major implication for the 
cantonal finance where payments arrears, especially in economically weaker cantons, are 
recurrent. Expenditure rules are imprecise and revenue allocation uneven. However the 
institutional set up provides no mechanisms and procedures to address these problems, 
which are a constant jeopardy to fiscal stability.  
 
Structure of the RS fiscal system is much simpler and includes collection of all significant 
fiscal revenues at the entity level. Such a solution for the RS was a consequence of the 
administrative structure, i.e. non-existence of the cantons in this territory. The RS budget is 
responsible for all three levels of education, military expenditures, social welfare of war 
invalids and families of killed soldiers, entity administration and foreign debt allocated to the 
RS.  9 
As noted before, political considerations were determining factor in shaping up the 
particular model of BiH's fiscal federalism. Its implementation has however revealed 
serious shortcomings and need for re- defining some of its key parameters, which requires 
local cal consensus. Some adjustments were made in the Federation in 1990-2000 to 
address the misalignment in fiscal responsibilities and revenue e ntitlements among the 
various levels of government, while the major attempt at a country- wide realignment was 
initiated in 2002 with the indirect tax reform. The result was that throughout the second half 
of the 1990s, weak economic performance and large needs for public spending, kept fiscal 




3.2.2  Reform of the monetary system and the system of internal payment 
operations  
The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBBiH) is the sole monetary authority in 
BiH. Specific nature of the political re-organization of BiH as a result of war is also reflected 
in the organization of the monetary system. The choice of a concept of limited monetary 
sovereignty of BiH  was politically motivated, depriving its Central Bank of the right to 
choose the type of monetary policy in the first six years and of its function as a lender of 
last resort. 
 
Limited monetary sovereignty of BiH is aimed at the elimination of political voluntarism in 
the monetary field, i.e. elimination of abuse of discretionary monetary policy. Such 
constraint was inevitable given the political make up of BiH as well as its sensitivity to the 
possibility of abuse of discretionary monetary policy. The decision to extend the same 
monetary regime for another six years as of August 2003 suggests that political risks still 
loom large over BiH capacity to takeover full monetary sovereignty.  
 
The Central Bank (CBBiH) is often identified as one of the most successful institutions in 
post -war BiH. The CBBiH was established in August 1997, operating on the currency 
board principles. A single currency - Convertible Mark (KM), introduced in June 1998
6, 
became the only legal means of payments in both cash and non- cash transactions in 
September 1999. The direct impact of the reform was a high increase in money supply:  
 
                                                                 
6   KM was fixed to the German Mark until January 2002 and to the euro from then on. 10 
Table 2 
Money supply 
millions of KM 
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 












Currency in circulation  162.5  515.3  651.7  1,673.9  1,734.4 
 MONEY - M1  310.0  1,099.9  1,401.7  2,692.3  3,007.6 
Time and savings deposits 











Demand deposits  











Time and savings deposits 











QUASI-MONEY- QM  1,237.0  1,065.1  1,065.6  1,977.0  2.063,7 
BROAD MONEY -M2  1,547.0  2,165.0  2,467.3  4,669.3  5,071.3 
Source: Central Bank of BH, Bulletin No 2/ 2003 
 
According to the principles of the currency board, the total amount of KM in circulation, 
increased for the deposits of the commercial banks with the CBBiH, must be covered by 
the foreign currency reserves in the amount exceeding 5% (after 2000 exceeding 10%) of 
the KM supply. This rule led to an increase in foreign currency reserves, which 
corresponded to the growth in primary  money. Foreign currency continued to grow 
steadily, not least due to the substantial inflow of international assistance. By 2002-2003 




Foreign currency reserves 












Net foreign currency reserves        283.3  1,021.2  2,666.5  2,463.2 
Monetary liabilities         253.9  973.2  2,591.6  2,345.2 
Net free reserves           29.4  48.0  75.0  118.1 
Source: Central Bank of BiH, monthly balances 12/1998 - 12/2002, www.cbbh.gov.ba 
 
Introduction of a single currency in non- cash payment transactions has created necessary 
prerequisites for a more efficient control of payment operations. It has also resulted in 
gradual reduction in the role of cash in payment transactions, which in turn has facilitated 11 
gradual elimination of the possibility to use foreign exchange to finance illegal activities. 
Another positive result was improved efficiency in controlling public revenue collection.   
 
State control over domestic payment transactions was eliminated by the abolishment of 
entity payment bureaus, and transfer of payment operations to commercial banks. The 
payment bureaus had been retained from the command economy, allowing full control of 
payment transactions and providing channels for diverting public funds. Moreover, they 
were perceived as depriving the financial system of much-needed liquidity, hence harming 
the banking sector, which combined with their capability to create credit, could undermine 
the currency board. In early 2001 the payment bureaus were closed and replaced by a 
commercial-bank clearing system, while the Central Bank assumed responsibility for high-
risk transactions. After some initial difficulties, the banks managed to provide an adequate 
payment-transactions clearing service but the transfer of some other responsibilities e.g. 
statistics has been less smooth. BiH has become the first country in transition to 
successfully implement the reform of the payment system. Since January 2001 BiH has in 
place one of the technologically most sophisticated systems of internal payment of any 
country in transition, accompanied in full by the upgrading of the payment operations 
abroad. The reform of the payment system was important for sustaining the currency board 
and was therefore completed in BiH at a relatively early stage of transition.  
 
 
3.2.3  Privatization  
3.2.3.1  Approach and implementation (problems of sequencing) 
Privatization process in BiH started before the war under the SFRY Law on Socially 
Owned Capital. Although the law had many weaknesses, it is nevertheless worth pointing 
out that its primary goal was privatization as part of transition to a market economy. 
However, new authorities in BiH quickly decided to review and halt privatization. The main 
objections were not to do with the efficiency of privatization or its detrimental effect on 
business performance. It sounds somewhat paradoxical that the first democratically 
elected authorities resisted the sale of socially owned property on the account of an 
extremely low sales price, although it was unclear on what basis the authorities concluded 
that something was undervalued when the capital market in BiH did not exist during that 
period (1991/92).
7 Therefore, the new authorities applied the same value judgements on 
the capital as the previous ("undemocratic") authorities. The issue of merit for such a move 
notwithstanding, it created widespread public distrust in privatization. This distrust 
culminated when the authorities nationalized socially owned property, ignoring a number of 
rights, which were defined during the period when the Law on Socially Owned Capital was 
                                                                 
7   It was evidently aimed at realigning political and economic powers of the existing authorities. Only a few months after 
the privatization process had been stopped, the new authorities proposed that socially owned assets should be 
distributed  to the citizens. 12 
in force.
8 Against BiH's specific circumstances eg the war's human toll and large scale 
devastation, violation of many rights, all of which are, from an ethical perspective, clearly 
above the right to property, it is obvious that the property issue in BiH is not yet viewed 
primarily or sufficiently in economic terms. Consequently, privatization in BiH does not 
have the social and economic importance it is commonly assigned to in a transition 
context.  
 
Privatization of the state-owned companies was set as one of the priority tasks in both BiH 
entities. Institutional framework for privatization was defined at the entity level. The state- 
level law, providing for the harmonization of entity laws, was passed in 1998. The 
approach, championed by the international community, was one in favour of fast 
privatization based on the assumption that enterprise restructuring would be easier once 
privatization is completed. The first drafts of entity privatization laws were prepared during 
1996 and early 1997 but privatization did not start before 1999. Although with some entity 
variations, the basic model was mass privatization. The Government issued certificates in 
the Federation and vouchers in RS to citizens in compensation for war-related debts, such 
as unpaid wages, pensions and lost foreign currency savings. Furthermore, in the 
Federation all citizens over 18 years of age were entitled to a general certificate, valued at 
KM 1,900, augmented by an amount corresponding to the number of years in employment. 
Mass privatization was designed to remove rapidly state-owned enterprises from the public 
sector, while tender was to be the principal means of attracting strategic investors and 
fresh capital. 
 
Quick privatization presupposed an accelerated procedure for the adoption of laws, the 
grasp of the letter and the spirit of the laws in a very short period of time, and their 
subsequent implementation. The rationale of accelerated privatization implied fast formal 
conversion of the certificates and vouchers into companies' shares and subsequent 
establishment of shareholders' assemblies, and new management in charge of creating of 
development and business policies of privatized companies. Establishment of financial 
market institutions went in parallel to the distribution of certificates and vouchers, and 
public shares offering.  
 
Privatization involved a wide range of activities both in technical- organizational terms as 
well as in terms of the adoption of necessary legislation. By way of illustration the 
legislative process in the Federation will be analysed briefly. Preliminary drafts of the Law 
on Privatization of Enterprises and Banks and the Law on Privatization of Apartments were 
finalized in mid  - 1996. It took over fifteen months for these laws to be adopted. 
Sequencing i n the adoption of the laws and decrees regulating the privatization process 
                                                                 
8   In Republika Srpska, the Law on Transfer of Assets from Social to State Property was adopted, Official Gazette of the 
Republika Srpska, number 4/93.  Bosnia  and Herzegovina adopted the Law on Transformation of Social Property, 
Official Gazette of BiH, 33/94. 13 
was to a certain extent illogical. The Law on property relations, which inter alia, defines the 
basic principles, subject and holders of rights and ownership, and the provisions of 
acquiring and cessation of ownership rights, was adopted more than three months after the 
adoption of the Law on Privatization of Enterprises, published in November 1997. The 
Ordinance on Review of the Previously Performed Ownership Transformation was also 
passed after the Law on Privatization of Enterprises (the 15
th of January 1998), although 
the review of privatization in the pre-war period was a precondition for preparing the 
opening balance sheet of enterprises in preparation for privatization.
9 
 
There were similar shortcomings in the adoption of other relevant pieces of privatization 
legislation. The law on privatization of banks was adopted in 1998, four months after the 
law on enterprise privatization, despite a common view that the sequencing should be 
reverse. The Instructions on Procedure of Drafting Bank Opening Balance Sheet were 
published on the 11the of June 1998. 
  
Since privatization in the FBiH was primarily based on mass distribution of the certificates 
to the citizens over eighteen, it was necessary to adopt the laws and decrees regulating 
the modalities, criteria, deadlines and techniques of issuing certificates. The Law on 
Determination and Realization of Citizens’ Claims in the Privatization Process was 
published on the 28
th of November 1997. Subsequently, the Instructions for Recording and 
Settlement of Citizens’ Claims from Unique Citizens’ Accounts were passed (15
th of 
January 1998). Since some of the deadlines defined in the Instructions were too ambitious, 
due to numerous organizational and technical problems related to the realization of this 
task, the Instructions on Amendments to the Instructions for Recording and Settlement of 
Citizens’ Claims from Unique Citizens’ Accounts were passed on the 6
th of July 1998. If 
one adds to this a series of other problems such as re-examination of distribution of funds 
registered at the military foreign currency books, outstanding debts in terms of unpaid 
pensions and, of course, the problem of determining the value of index point of the general 
certificates, one gets a better picture of the scope of legal standardization and 
harmonization required by the provisions of all relevant laws and decrees. 
 
In the meantime, two sets of general elections took place- in 1996 and 1998, having an 
impact on the dynamics of implementation of privatization laws. In the FBiH parliament 
adopts all laws pertaining to privatization. Given the time required for the elections and 
constitution of the new Parliament, adoption of the laws necessary for the efficient 
implementation of privatization was slowed down. Additional problem was that any newly 
adopted law might imply adoption of decrees or even adoption of new law(s), in order to 
ensure that the whole process was legally regulated in an appropriate way. In this sense, 
                                                                 
9   Legal framework of privatization in both BiH entities recognised a continuity of the privatization process initiated in the 
pre-war period. In other words, the share capital which had been subscribed and effectively paid in accordance with so 
called  Markovic's Law was recognised as incontestable private capital and it was not subject to privatization.  14 
the Law on Securities, the Law on Securities Register, the Law on Securities Commission 
(published on the 15
th of October 1998) and the Law on Fund Management Companies 
and Investment Funds (published on the 22
nd of October 1998) serve as good examples. 
The Czech Republic experience may be used as a vivid example of negative 
consequences arising out of insufficient legal regulations of all important aspects of the 
privatization process. The Czech Republic adopted some of the important laws only at a 
later stage (e.g. Law on Securities Register), which resulted in major application problems 
post festum.  
 
 
3.2.3.2  Basic models of enterprise privatization  
All companies with state owned capital entered the privatization process having gone 
through appropriate preparatory procedure, which involved preparation of opening balance 
sheets. The balance sheets were cleared of all pre- war domestic and foreign debts. The 
state owned capital was a subject of privatization. Out of that amount, in RS 10% was 
allocated to the pension fund, 5% to the restitution fund, 55% for the distribution to the 
population in the form of vouchers and 30% was to be sold for cash and old foreign 
currency savings. In the Federation, the value of the index point of certificates was derived 
from the total value of the state capital, and certificates were distributed to all the citizens 
over eighteen in various amounts depending on the age, years of service, service in armed 
forces during the war, and outstanding claims on pre-war foreign currency savings. In RS, 
vouchers did not have a nominal value unlike in the Federation. All RS citizens, including 
children, were entitled to vouchers, although not everybody received the same number of 
vouchers. Citizens were free to choose companies in which to invest. They were also given 
a possibility to exchange their vouchers for the shares in investment funds.  
 
Mass privatization was meant to be implemented in a relatively short period of time (up to 2 
years). Some feared that such a process, including all state owned companies and banks 
and almost all citizens, could become chaotic. One of the fundamental problems stemmed 
from a formal freedom of choice given to the citizens in terms of deciding what to do with 
vouchers and certificates, given the low purchasing power of majority of the citizens, lack of 
information and inadequate knowledge of the process itself. Freedom of choice is basically 
a good approach and it represents a basis for establishment and further development of 
market economy. However, freedom of choice implies that vouchers and certificates on the 
privatization accounts of the citizens are at their unlimited disposal. Therefore, citizens 
have a choice to decide which company to invest in, but also whether to sell or give away 
their vouchers or certificates. Prices of vouchers and certificates are quickly formed at the 
market. However, it is likely that the prices will be lower than the assumed nominal value of 
vouchers and certificates. Of course, there is nothing wrong with vouchers and certificates 
transactions, provided that they are purely considered as market transactions. However, 
taking into account the fact that they had been created in order to allow the citizens to 15 
participate in the privatization, their purchase at low price may cause social and political 
problems. Given on one hand a large number of citizens in dire economic situation, and 
sudden availability of a large number of vouchers and certificates on the other, the price of 
these mass privatization instruments had  dropped drastically. This opened way to 
speculations with certificates and vouchers, which began to be traded informally. Faced 
with all these problems both technical and more substantial related to the very method of 
mass privatization, the process was completed by 2001 in Republika Srpska and 2002 in 
the Federation- way beyond the initial schedule. Some 70% of small enterprises in the 
Federation and 47% in Republika Srpska were sold. The effect of mass privatization has 
been however negligible as far as providing economy with fresh funding, expertise, know 
how and markets. 
 
Tender based privatization was another approach, which was only stepped up in late 
2000
10. According to entity laws regulating mass privatization, company buyers had no 
contractual obligations to take over specific responsibilities eg in terms of investment, 
number of employees and overall price. In contrast, tender based privatization sets a list of 
attractive companies, defines main criteria relating to investment, obligations to employees 
and cash payment. However, lack of agreement between foreign experts and 
organizations providing technical assistance with regard to the approach to the 
privatization process in BiH, coupled with a lack of knowledge of local actors were an 
important impediment to faster and more successful tender privatization. Equally important 
impediment were obstructions by the local authorities, reluctant to part control particularly 
over strategic enterprises, which provided an important source of funding for the political 
parties. The debate over an international loan to assist privatization went on for almost two 
years on the grounds that most of these funds would go to foreign experts, which might not 
necessarily work in the best interest of the country. By the end of 2002 only some 25% of 
the total of 1064 enterprises in the Federation, not including those declared as strategic, 
was fully privatized compared to 41% in RS. A total of some 40 strategic enterprises were 
sold by the end of 2002 and by 2003 the process was almost halted.  
 
Inadequate powers, expertise and often insufficient engagement of privatization agencies 
have been identified as some of the main reasons for poor results of privatization. As 
stated before, political obstructions by the local parties were a major obstacle. In Republika 
Srpska the law was amended in 2003 stipulating that the government has to consult the 
parliament on the sales of strategic companies; the most vocal were the trade unions of the 
electricity company arguing in favour of keeping the state as majority shareholder. Various 
irregularities were identified in a number of privatization deals, thus further undermining the 
confidence of potential investors. In 2003, under the pressure from the international 
                                                                 
10   Tender sales were temporarily suspended in the F ederation in early 2000, and resumed only after the changes 
demanded by the international community were implemented. 16 
community, the entity  governments pledged to revive privatization but no major 
breakthrough was underway in early 2004. 
 
 
3.2.4  Financial sector reform  
The BiH financial sector is predominantly based on commercial banking. The total assets 
of commercial banks in BiH in mid 2003 amounted to 6,8 billion KM, which represents 
90,7% of the total assets of BiH financial sector. Apart from commercial banks, BiH 
financial sector includes 28 insurance companies and 44 micro-credit organizations. At the 
beginning of the reforms, commercial banking sector accounted for 96% of the total assets 
of BiH financial sector. The financial sector reform was mostly focused on the reform of 
commercial banks, given their predominant role in the financial system of BiH. 
 
Commercial banking reform was primarily aimed at implementing financial liberalization 
measures. Financial liberalization involved: elimination of state in interest rate 
determination and the extension of credit, bank privatization, free entry of foreign banks 
and free international movement of capital. It also implied the adoption of Basle standards 
of managing assets and risks in commercial banking.  
 
Financial liberalization was implemented at the entity level, and at a faster pace in FBiH 
than in RS. However, compared to other sectors, this set of reforms was the most dynamic 
one. In the FBiH the reforms commenced in 1997, and in RS in 1998. The first step 
involved establishment of banking agencies in both entities, which undertook the 
responsibility for issuing and revoking licenses  to the banks, as well as for their 
supervision. Adoption of the Law on Privatization of Banks and the Law on Opening 
Balance Sheet of Companies and Banks (1997 and 1998) facilitated the beginning of the 
bank privatization process. Problems related to pre-war foreign currency savings and the 
pre-war foreign currency loans, that is- unrecoverable loans transferred from the pre-war 
period- were solved by either write-offs or transfer to the entity governments. Substantial 
part of the debt to Paris and London Club was also written off in 1997-1998.  
 
Bank privatization in both entities was not so complicated and did not hinder development 
of this sector, unlike the privatization of companies. One of the most important reasons, 
apart from relatively painless solution to the problem of outstanding debt guaranteed for by 
BiH, was the fact that the Law on Foreign Investment from 1995 provided for the 
establishment of foreign banks in FBiH immediately after the war. Already in 1996-1997 in 
the Federation there were several foreign banks with 100% or majority ownership. The 
adoption of the BiH Law on Foreign Direct Investment (1998), the establishment of the 
CBBiH and introduction of a single currency in cash, and, in particular, non- cash 
transactions (1998/1999), stabilization of political and military situation (1999/2000), and 
the extension of the High Representative's authorities all contributed to strong interest by 17 
the foreign investors. At the end of 2002, market share of 10 major banks amounted to 
61,6% of total assets of the banking sector, which increased from KM3,7bn to KM6,8bn 
between 1998 and mid- 2003.      
   
Table 4 
BiH Commercial banks consolidated balance sheet 




Assets / Liabilities 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 












     A S S E T S             
1.  Reserves  208  275  287  872  595  537 
2.  Foreign currency assets  605  848  961  1.364  1.469  1.568 
3.  Receivables- Government   113  37  34  33  61  57 














5.  Receivables- households   260  277  399   704  1.506  1.828 
    














      L I A B I L I T I E S             
6.  General Government deposits  222  170   143  278  390  376 




















































11.  Bonds  1.606  1.519  1.577  1.526  1.794  1.963 
12.  Capital accounts  1.311  1.257  1.096  1.118  1.214  1.227 

















Source: Central Bank BiH, Bulletin 2/2003, page 112. 
 
Financial deregulation in interest rates is full. The CBBH, in conformity with the currency 
board principles, does not have any influence on the level of interest rates. Freedom of 
establishing banks, as an important element of financial liberalization, is granted to both 
residents and non-residents who meet the basic conditions in terms of minimum core 
capital requirement and technical and expert requirements set by banking agencies in both 18 
entities. The openness of the BiH banking sector is reflected in the that non- resident co-
own over 75% of the bank capital stock in the country. Bank autonomy is legally 
guaranteed, with the exception of state owned banks whose share in the banking sector 
has been reduced significantly. Finally, liberalization of international capital flows is almost 
entirely implemented, except for investments in specific sectors such as military industry, 
lottery, media and public utilities.  
 
Financial reforms in BiH are among the most advanced in South East Europe as the table 
on financial inter-mediation shows. 
 
Table 5 







 GDP ratio 
 
 
Ratio of loans to 
companies and 
citizens to GDP 
 
Loans to 
 deposits ratio  
 
Albania        
       1999  49.8  2.6  6.6 
       2001  50.7  2.9  7.1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina       
       1999  45.1  31.9  86.7 
       2001  51.4  29.8  71.8 
Bulgaria        
       1999  34.6  10.1  39.3 
       2001  41.3  14.0  43.4 
Croatia       
       1999  66.1  32.4  80.6 
       2001  91.1  39.5  61.5 
Macedonia, FYR       
       1999  53.6  11.0  76.6 
       2001  53.8  10.8  40.9 
Romania        
       1999  33.8  10.7  49.4 
       2001  31.2  10.5  50.3 
Serbia and Montenegro       
       2000  201.9  99.7  359.2 
       2001  41.8  16.6  122.8 
Source: Web sites and annual reports of central banks of SEE countries; EBRD, Transition report 2002, London, October 
2002, pages 113, 129, 133, 137, 149, 153, 189. 
 
The BiH commercial banking sector is second to Croatia in terms of financial inter-
mediation. Financial deepening in BiH was direct result of a rapid growth in the number 19 
and market share of foreign banks after 2000, which focused their credit activities on 
households, and much less on corporate sector. The household credit/deposit ratio 
amounted to 105% in 2002, suggesting negative savings rate. 
 
Financial sector reform in BiH involved preparation of legal and institutional basis for the 
financial market, or more precisely, capital market. In FBiH, the package of laws on capital 
market was adopted in the last quarter of 1998, and in RS in 1999. Following the adoption 
of these laws, securities commissions and securities registers were established at the 
entity level (in FBiH and in RS). As with other laws, there is no unified regulatory institution 
in this domain at the state level. Therefore, from the very beginning of the reform financial 
markets are institutionally and legally divided on an entity basis. Establishment of the 
Securities Commission of FBiH, FBiH Securities Register, RS Securities Commission and 
RS Securities Register was the basis for the registration and sale of companies' shares in 
mass privatization. Their establishment preordained the establishment of the capital market 
on an entity basis. Capital market was institutionalized in RS with the establishment of 
Banja Luka Securities Exchange (BLSE) and Sarajevo Stock Exchange (SASE) at the end 
of 2001 and at the beginning of 2002, respectively.  
 
 
3.2.5  Liberalization of the foreign trade regime  
Liberalization of trade regime started in the Federation in early 1996, when quotas, taxes, 
tariffs and special licenses for exports were eliminated. Quantitative restrictions on imports 
other than licenses required for a limited number of goods were also eliminated. In RS 
quotas on exports and imports of certain products remained in place, and the tax of exports 
of certain raw materials was retained. In 1998 Foreign Trade Law at the country level was 
passed introducing a liberal trade regime. It guarantees free movement of exports and 
imports without quantitative restrictions. It stipulates non- discriminatory treatment of 
imports and gives it the same legal and tax treatment as to domestic goods. It allows the 
state temporary restrictions on imports, exports and transit of certain goods on health and 
safety grounds. The tariff structure was simplified and entities ordered to cancel 
preferential trade agreements with Croatia and FR Yugoslavia and to rescind additional 
entity taxes.  
 
The state level law on foreign trade set up the conditions to start negotiations on bilateral 
free trade agreements with SEE countries as well as preparations for starting negotiations 
on the accession of BiH to the World Trade Organization.  
 
Bilateral free trade agreements with the countries of former Yugoslavia were concluded 
first, followed by other countries in the region under the auspices of the Stability Pact for 
South East Europe trade liberalization initiative. The first free trade agreement was signed 
with Croatia, then with Slovenia, Serbia and M ontenegro (former FR of Yugoslavia) and 20 
Macedonia. The first three agreements were based on the principle of asymmetry, given 
the fact that BiH sustained the greatest degree of destruction after the dissolution of SFRY, 
and that it was excluded from the foreign trade exchange flows for the longest period of 
time (1992 - 1995). Asymmetry of these agreements is based on contractual provisions 
according to which goods and services produced in BiH were exempted from customs 
duties immediately in the first year upon conclusion of the agreement, while customs duties 
on goods and services of other countries of former SFRY are gradually reduced and are 
lifted in the fourth year after the signing of the agreement.  
 
BiH has been granted preferential export regimes, on the basis of international system of 
preferences (GSP or GSTP). These arrangements provide for the export of all goods made 
in BiH to the countries of the European Union, if they meet technical and technological 
standards. This arrangement will be in effect until the end of 2005. Apart from the countries 
of the European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been granted the preferential status 
by Switzerland, Norway, Japan, USA, Russia and Canada. Preferential arrangement 
between BiH and the EU countries may be annulled if BiH fails to respect the following 
conditions: EU rules on origin, refraining from introduction of new export levies and 
increase of the existing ones (customs and quantitative restrictions), involvement of BiH in 
the efficient crime prevention activities, readiness of BiH to commit to the economic 
reforms and regional co-operation in the process of accession and stabilization.
11 The 
effect of these arrangements aimed at redressing large trade imbalances, as will be shown 
later, has however been modest. 
 
By introducing amendments to the regulations in the field of customs tariffs and unified 
customs policy, average level of duty rates in BiH after 2000 was reduced significantly 
compared to other SEE countries. Table 6 shows the World Bank data on protective tariffs 
in SEE countries.  
 
Given that throughout 1998/1999 enforcement of customs regulation was poor due to the 
lack of state control over the borders it can be argued that the BiH market, as far as the 
effective protective tariffs are concerned, was the most liberal in the region. This is 
supported by the World Bank data according to which no product in BiH has a duty above 
15%. At the same time, the share of products with duties exceeding 15% among SEE 
countries is the following: Albania 38.3%, Bulgaria 30%, Croatia 30.8%, Macedonia 47.4%, 
Romania 45.9% and Slovenia 23.1%.  
 
 
                                                                 
11   See: BiH Council of Ministers - Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, Second proposal of BiH 
Development Strategy - PRSP - 2003-2007, May 2003.  21 
Table 6 










Standard deviation of 
tariff rates (%) 
Albania  11.8  11.8  6.9 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  7.6  6.6  4.4 
Bulgaria  13.8  10.9  11.3 
Croatia  12.0  9.8  7.4 
Macedonia FYR  15.9  13.8  11.6 
Romania  18.1  13.7  15.9 
Serbia and Montenegro  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Slovenia  11.4  9.9  7.0 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, Washington, 2003, Chapter 6, pp. 326-328; data for Serbia and 
Montenegro are not available. 
 
 
3.2.6  Labour market reforms 
Although labour market reforms were included in the initial list, during the first three post-
war years they remained rather limited and burdened by the legacy of war. Working age 
men were the most affected category during the war in a sense that many took an active 
part in military. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, a large number of 
men who were able to work were demobilized in 1996. The companies in which they 
worked before the war or during the war were legally obliged to keep them. Given that 
majority of companies was not operational or worked at a fraction of capacity, the return of 
demobilized soldiers implied significant increase in labour costs. Due to specific status of a 
large number of workers on pay roll in both entities, the category of "wait-listed workers", 
taken over from the pre-war legislation, became one of the biggest barriers to the reforms 
of labour legislation. 
 
The status of "wait-listed workers" means that a worker for whom a company cannot 
provide a job is neither fired nor referred to the labour market, but remains on the company 
pay roll. These persons are considered as employed, and the companies take over a part 
of obligations toward them, such as health and pension insurance and in some cases pay 
a fraction of a salary. This category was created in a socio-political climate which may be 
described as a conflict of, on one hand self-management inertia still prevalent in state 
owned companies, and on the other, of objective market requirements necessitating the 
establishment of labour market. Therefore, it reflects a compromise between essentially 
guaranteed employment in state owned companies, as a self- management legacy, and an 
increasingly strong pressure to privatize state owned companies and make them 
competitive, including recruitment based on competitive footing.  
 22 
The largest number of "wait-listed workers " in the post-war BiH consisted of persons who 
returned to their pre-war companies following the end of the war. Possibilities for their 
employment depended directly on the opportunities for resumption of production . And 
these were limited given that the availability of credit to mainly state- owned companies 
was much more restricted than to private ones. Therefore, "wait-listed workers" were de 
facto unemployed, but they were entitled to social protection and a minimum salary. For 
this reason the official employment and unemployment statistics in the entire post-war 
period were very unreliable, and could not serve as a basis for an objective evaluation of 
the extent of the problem of BiH labour market.  
 
Table 7 












Number of inhabitants - 1998 estimation        2.250.000       1.392.000        3.642.000 
Number of working age inhabitants,  
from 15 to 64 - estimation 
 
     1.500.500    
 
        907.200 
 
     2.407.700 
Available manpower in total           872.000          528.000       1.400.000 
Official employment in BiH          407.000           202.000           609.000  
Registered unemployment          249.000          143.000          392.000 
Number of wait-listed workers             70.000            45.000          115.000 
Registered and unregistered 
unemployment  
 
        465.000 
 
        326.000 
 
        791.000 
Narrow unemployment rate             28,6 %           27,1 %           25,2 % 
Unemployment rate, including the wait-
listed workers  
 
         36,6 %  
 
         35,6 % 
 
         36,2 % 
Source: Authors' estimate based on the data published by the Federal Statistical Office, Statistical Office of RS, and Statistical 
Agency of BH  
 
Labour market reforms started at the entity level without adoption of the state level law. 
The main incentive was to solve the problem of wait-listed workers, and subsequently to 
resolve the issues of minimum salaries, right to compensation based on employment, and 
other rights stemming from employment, by concluding collective agreements and branch 
agreements between trade unions and employers. The Labour Law, which was adopted in 
2000, gave the companies two possibilities to resolve the wait- list status of their workers: 
to give them full time work or to make them redundant and provide severance payment. As 
the specified severance payment to dismissed workers was too high for majority of 
companies, the implementation of this law was postponed until mid 2001, when the 
amendments to the law were adopted. The main purpose of the amendments was to 
reduce the scope of obligations of companies in terms of providing payments to the wait-
listed workers.    23 
The rights of workers in BiH were institutionally regulated by a number of laws. Besides, 
labour costs, i.e. gross salaries were determined by previously adopted Law on Income 
Tax (1996,1997, 1998), Amendments to the Law on Income Tax (2000) and the Law on 
Contributions (1998, 2000). A major source of problems related to institutional regulation of 
the workers' rights is linked to signing of collective agreements, provisions of which are 
binding only for the companies with majority state ownership. Unequal application of 
institutional provisions referring to workers' rights protection has been conducive to 
formation of two parallel markets: official labour market, where the costs of labour are 
burdened with compulsory taxes and contributions, and informal labour market, the share 
of which amounts to almost 80%.  
 
 
4  Problems, obstacles and outcome of the reforms  
4.1 Institutional problems and obstacles  
During 1995-2000 institutional obstacles were a major barrier to the creation of a legal 
framework necessary for the implementation of reforms. Complicated procedure of 
harmonization and adoption of laws, which would serve the interests of all citizens, and 
delays in the adoption of the key laws, prevented BiH from becoming an economic 
community and from developing as a single economic space. This is best illustrated by the 
fact that The High Representative decreed the establishment of some of the key state 
institutions. In 2000 only, some 27 decisions were taken, including on basic laws such as 
state border service, on standardization, on travel documents, on meteorology and on BiH 
customs policy. 
 
The imposed laws are applied on a temporary basis until adopted by the BiH Parliament. It 
took 6 to 10 months for the BiH Parliamentary Assembly to adopt even these laws, which 
represent the basic minimum for the functioning of any state. Establishment of the BiH 
Institute for Standards and Metrology may serve as an example of the lack of interest in 
establishing BiH state institutions. BiH obtained a special preferential treatment for exports 
to the EU without restrictions, provided that the goods and services meet the standards. 
The fact that there was no a state-level institution in charge of quality certification meant 
that companies could not make use of this preferential arrangement. Although there was 
an alleged interest by both entities, the BiH I nstitute for Standards and Metrology was 
eventually established only after the High Representative imposed the state level law.  
 
Another example of institutional weaknesses being exploited by the national elites in the 
post-war period was "privatization"  of the state border. The Dayton Peace Agreement 
allowed entity authorities to control the state border crossings, which enabled networks of 
criminal groups involved in smuggling and other forms of illegal trade to operate almost 
unchecked, thus depriving the budgets of millions of KM. Given the extent of grey and 24 
black markets of goods, labour and services it is estimated that BiH lost approximately one 
and a half of its GDP in 1995-2000 or some $6 bn. Finally, the Law on State Border 
Service was adopted by the BiH Parliamentary Assembly following the decision by the 
High Representative.  
 
 
4.2 Problems of the fiscal system  
The concept and structure of fiscal federalism in BiH has showed serious shortcomings 
regarding the provision of public services. In a  relatively small space (BiH market), 
entrepreneurs are faced with a non-uniform fiscal regulations. Of course, tax competition is 
not necessarily bad in a developed market ambience. However, against the level of 
development of fiscal decentralization in BiH it would result in entities alternating losses 
and gains, which has a negative impact on the long-term business development. Thus, in 
this model harmonization rather than tax competition, which could lead to "tax war", is a 
more rational solution. 
 
The existing model of fiscal decentralization is mainly intended to resolve potential political 
conflicts at the level of peoples and entities. This is important by way of creating initial 
conditions for political stability. However, fiscal division between entities and the state, or 
the Federation and cantons, does not mean that the problem of fiscal decentralization is 
fully or adequately solved. What it can quite well do is to reduce or change the level of 
centralization, while tax payers at the local level still might not see the link between the 
taxes they pay and the quality of public services at the local level. Therefore, greater 
concern for economic principles is of critical importance in further reforms of the fiscal 
system, a concern that was only marginally addressed in the course of initial reforms. 
 
Fundamental weakness of BiH fiscal system in 1996-2000 was the possibility of tax 
competition between the entities stemming out of differences in tax rates (turnover tax and 
excise duty) and uneven application of the Unified Customs Policy in BiH. Fiscal system 
has been one of the main obstacles to business development: 
–  The fiscal system is complicated, it includes unforeseeable retroactive tax obligations 
and is characterized by insufficient harmonization of fiscal laws between the entities, 
which discourages inter-entity trade, and encourages uncontrolled import. 
–  Legal system is slow, inefficient and discouraging for development of business 
operations, while administrative procedures are lengthy and complicated.
 12  
 
                                                                 
12   The World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina-1996-1998 Lessons and Accomplishments  - Review of the Priority 
Reconstruction Program and Looking Ahead Towards Sustainable Economic Development, May 1999, Annex 11, 
page 3.  25 
The reforms to address some of these problems were stepped up in 1999- 2000. The 
outcome was a significant narrowing down of the gap in tax rates, and the reduction of the 
number of taxes applied until mid 2000. The reduction in the number of taxes from 4 to 2 
(2000), followed by a reduction in the tax rates in the FBiH (2001), significantly reduced the 
space for tax competition at inter-entity level. However, one of the fundamental problems of 
the tax system in both entities, i.e. its complexity arising from the approach that the 
turnover tax is collected at the final stage of consumption, remained one of the main 
barriers to development of efficient and harmonized tax system.  
 
Parallel to the reforms aimed at streamlining the tax system and improving revenue 
collection, reforms at the reduction and restructuring of public expenditures were also put in 
place focusing on cuts in military spending, overhaul of the disability and war veteran 
benefits and pension system. Public spending was reduced from 64.5% GDP in 1998 to 
56.2% in 2002- still in excess of BiH's fiscal capacity. As a result, fiscal performance 
improved and consolidated budget deficit fell from around 5.1% of GDP in 1998 to 4.3% in 
2002. However, efforts at fiscal consolidation were accompanied by an increase in public 
sector arrears, which were arrested in 2002. Escrow accounts, including privatization 
proceeds and assets allocated to BiH as part of SRF Yugoslavia succession process, were 
set up to deal with domestic debt settlement. Oversized public sector remains a major 
source of fiscal pressures and will require significant downsizing. Rationalization and 
restructuring of public spending would also have to address the balance between the 
capital and current expenditures, since for most of the post- war period majority of capital 
spending was met by external funding. 
 
 
4.3 Problems, obstacles and failures in enterprise privatization  
Privatization process in BiH in the post-Dayton period was complicated by the fact that it 
was i mplemented separately in two entities. Non-existence of unified legislation was the 
first important contradiction of one of the main requirements of regulated market economy - 
to have a clear and comprehensive legal system. Privatization was politically motivated 
and was not a part of a coherent reform programme. Another fundamental problem was to 
do with the predominant privatization model. Majority of state capital in both entities was 
privatized through public offering of shares, i.e. by exchange of certificates and vouchers 
for companies' shares (some 85% of the privatized assets excluding utilities). The basic 
weakness of mass privatization is that it does not solve any of the issues of crucial 
importance for the enterprise performance. It brings no profit either to the state or 
companies and therefore no possibility of creating funds to finance company restructuring 
or to resolve social issues.  
 
The second problem arising from mass privatization is a very low concentration of 
necessary knowledge about  market and market institutions, and in particular about 26 
different options of restructuring and market re-positioning of companies. In majority of 
cases, shareholders in companies are persons who do not have the relevant knowledge, 
and managers of privatized companies lack skills and knowledge of local, regional and 
global markets. Apart from a lack of knowledge on the part of shareholders and managers, 
the problem of privatized companies is further complicated by the fact that new owners do 
not have a contractual obligation to invest and restructure their companies. The third 
aggravating factor is surplus of workers. Solution to this problem is neglected within the 
privatization process, without developing adequate social programmes and financial 
sources to fund them. In BiH many smaller companies were acquired by management, 
employees and private investment funds, which provided no investment or know how. 
 
Formal corporatization of companies in both entities was conducted after the mass 
privatization. Selection of models and implementation of corporatization in RS companies 
were subject to political interests in order to preserve the influence of the authorities on the 
companies as long as possible. The chosen model was particularly confusing to strategic 
investors, who were offered up to 30% of the state capital value, while they did not know 
about the number of shares they would get, total issue of shares, or dispersion of the 
remaining 70% of the shares. This was the main reason for moderately low interest of 
strategic investors in privatization in RS, especially foreign investors. Thus, privatization in 
RS turned into "hunting grounds" for different speculators who invested in other people's 
vouchers, acquired them on someone else’s behalf with 70% discount of the average 
nominal value, or invested other people's coupons for pre-war foreign currency savings, 
also bought with a high discount rate. On the other hand, the state retained an important 
role in managing the unsold state capital and the shares of investment funds. Although one 
of the privatization objectives was to attract foreign investments, this did not materialize to 
any significant extent. In the privatization process, foreign investors were discriminated 
against: they could not use any of the preferential schemes. Therefore, privatization in RS 
became a privilege of domestic speculators and the state.  
 
Mass privatization in the FBiH was implemented in 2001/2002. Privatization funds also 
participated in the mass privatization, enabling linking up physical and legal persons on the 
basis of their mutual interest or on the basis of ethnic affiliation. As in RS, corporatization of 
companies in the territory of FBiH did not result in creating conditions conducive to efficient 
and fast restructuring. The idea to bridge the huge gap in the know-how on privatization 
and corporate governance with participation of privatization investment funds and fund 
management companies has so far proved not particularly successful.  
 
Overall the results of privatization have been very modest. The share of private sector in 
GDP is estimated at around 40-45%. Five years since the start of privatization many large 
enterprises have failed to restructure and privatize, while large number of privatized ones 
suffer from poor corporate governance. The participation of strategic investors on which 27 
the main economic impact of privatization hinged has been disappointing, Privatization in 
the way and at the pace at which it has progressed in BiH has failed to have a major 
impact on the development of market economy. 
 
 
4.4 Problems of financial sector reforms  
Two main problems of BiH's financial sector reforms are disproportionate focus on 
commercial banking reforms at the expense of institutions for financing restructuring and 
development of companies, and insufficient development of BiH financial market. 
Commercial banks reform in BiH has been one of the most successful among transition 
countries. However, strengthening control and supervision of banking operations, through 
the adoption of the Basle Standards, resulted in the restructuring of commercial banks 
assets. They shifted the focus of their operations away from the corporate sector towards 
households and maintained liquidity by keeping deposits abroad. This is important from the 
point of inter-linkage among various reforms in the process of transition. Because the 
banks continued to perceive lending to largely unrestructured corporate sector as higher 
risk option, they favoured households in their lending portfolio. Given the currency board 
arrangement, strong credit growth as a reflection of financial deepening produced by the 
reform became a threat to macroeconomic stability in 2002, by its upward pressure on the 
current account deficit. A set of monetary reforms was initiated to slow down the credit 
growth and further bank regulatory reforms enacted aimed at removing remaining 
deviations from international standards. 
 
Beginning of financial liberalization in BiH resulted in an enormous increase in market 
interest rates. Gradually, as a result of new entry of foreign banks and an increase in the 
minimum capital requirement ratio, interest rates declined. However, one of the 
consequences of banks directing their activity to less risky portfolios led to the export of 
capital. As the reserves of the commercial banks with CBBiH are included in the CBBiH 
liabilities and have to be covered by foreign assets, the total amount of exported capital, 
intended as insurance of commercial banks against risk, amounted to KM2bn KM at the 
end of 2002. This amount is higher than the amount of loans that BiH received in the post-
war period. These data clearly demonstrate that BiH economy will not be able to achieve 
significant growth rates without a strong support from development and export-import 
banks. Reliance on foreign direct investments, as the most important factor of balancing 
trade deficit and accumulation of foreign currency reserves, has so far proved not an 
effective strategy. Out of USS 848 million of total foreign investment in BiH (1994-2002), 
relatively small share were greenfield direct investment.  
 
As suggested above, financial deregulation in an environment lacking institutions for crisis 
management and development incentives, resulted in the banks shifting their lending 
portfolio away from the corporate sector into less risky sources of revenue. This leads to a 28 
paradoxical conclusion of BiH becoming an exporter of capital. The commercial banks, 
which dominate the banking sector structure their portfolios in compliance with the rules 
based on the existing international standards. In this environment, more than two fifths of 
assets of commercial banks have practically no impact on the development of BiH 
economy. Therefore, a radical shift toward establishment and/or attracting financial 
institutions for funding development projects, along with well-defined export-orientated 
strategy, are crucial for economic revival of BiH. 
 
 
4.5 Problems of reforms of foreign trade relations  
The logic behind BiH's free trade agreements with countries in the region was based on 
the assumption that removing customs barriers on products and services from BiH would 
result in substantial export expansion, accompanied by a reduction or at least a slow down 
in the growth of imports. Data on BiH trade with Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia and 
Montenegro suggest this has not happened. The key issue is that improvement in BiH 
trade performance is limited by its narrow export capacity as medium and large companies 
in the processing industry sector, the main potential exporters, were until recently state 
owned or are still undergoing privatization. In majority of these companies restructuring has 
not been completed, while in some of them it has not even started. Funds in support of 
continuous expansion of export activities either do not exist in BiH or they are available at 
interest rates twice as high as those in the neighbouring countries, which discourages 
potential exporters.  
 
Table 8 
BiH Trade deficits with main trade partners 






  2000   2001  2002 
 




- 6,215         
 
- 6,879 
OF WHICH WITH:       
Croatia  - 779  - 857    - 1.017 
Slovenia  - 848  - 770  -   732 
Germany  - 543  - 444  -   736 
Italy  - 189  - 544  -   541 
Hungary  - 300  - 402  -   478 
Austria  - 294  - 333  -  380 
Serbia and Montenegro  + 26  - 57  -   277 
Source: Federation Statistical Office, Statistical data on economic and other trends, 2/2002, pp. 44-45; Central bank BiH, 
Bulletin 2/2003 29 
Much attention in analysing export performance in transition countries has focused on 
progress in trade liberalization. In BiH, the problem has not been in markets being closed; 
on the contrary, the World Bank data on tariff protection of domestic production indicate 
that BiH producers are the least protected in the entire SEE region. The weighted average 
tariff protection rate in Slovenia and Croatia is by 33% higher than in BiH. Similarly, 
weighted average tariff protection rates of Romania and Macedonia are twice as high. BiH 
has the largest trade deficit in the region; it stood at 31.4% of GDP in 2002.  
 
Table 9 
BiH: Balance of payments, 1998 to 2002 














I CURRENT ACCOUNT  - 2,043  - 2,678  - 2,531  - 3,403  - 4,398 
1. Goods  - 5,482  - 6,052  - 5,567  - 6,456  - 7,023 
2. Services  257  192  221  241  144 
3. Income  751  715  669  697  533 
4. Current transfers  2,431  2,468  2,145  2,116  1,947 


















1. Capital account  766  946  862  803  711 
2. Financial account  1,310  1,710  1,657  2,122  3,499 
    - Direct 











    - Other  











     - Reserve  























Source: Central bank BiH, Bulletin 2/2003, page 139. 
 
The main impediment to BiH benefiting from the opportunities created by the opening of 
the EU and neighbouring countries' markets and indeed to the development in general has 
been the lack of unified economic space. The lack of institutions supporting functional 
integration based on technological and resource compatibility and joint entry into foreign 
markets, along with the problems of financing, are some of the key obstacles for 
improvement in BiH's external position through the reduction in trade deficit. Although 
exports have grown steadily since 1996, they have been surpassed by strong growth in 
imports- a trend which was somewhat attenuated in 2000-2001 due to slow down in 
reconstruction- related activity as the main source of import demand. However, imports 30 
grew strongly again in 2002 propelled by the credit boom, driving the trade deficit up. Large 
trade deficit has been the main cause of current account deficit, which stood at some 22% 
of GDP in 2002.  
 
 
4.6 Problems of labour market reforms 
BiH labour market does not exist in the true sense of this word. Terms “employed” and 
“unemployed” represent formal categories rather than the actual supply and demand for 
work. This "formality" of labour market is a consequence of the still prevalent socialist-type 
legislation in this field, but also of the inertia evident in state owned companies and 
institutions. The main problems in the labour market are the following: 
–  lack of competition for every vacant job and between the employed and the 
unemployed; 
–  lack of sectoral and regional mobility of workforce; 
–  wage determination which does not reflect the true costs of labour, but depends more 
on the position of a company or institution and the line of business, rather than on 
efficiency and situation at the labour market. 
 
At the beginning of transition, deteriorating situation in the state sector, implementation of 
economic reforms and development of private sector necessitated changes in the 
approach to labour market regulation inherited from socialist times. Establishment of labour 
market has evolved through the conflict of socialist and market principles of the utilization 
of labour as a factor of production. The phenomenon of so called "wait- list" workers 
discussed earlier was the side effects of the confrontation of these two concepts, and an 
indication of resistance of socialist principles. At the same time informalization of labour as 
an anarchic approach to establishing free market came to be one of the main 
characteristics of BiH labour market. The confluence of a range of factors i.e. heritage of 
pre- war legislation, aggravated by the specific problems related to war and post- war 
situation, restricted access to finance for the state owned enterprises and slow privatization 
opened the way for the creation of two labour markets in BiH. The formal one regulated by 
entity laws and collective agreements and an informal one, which offered opportunities for 
temporary and occasional work, as a source of income. By its nature, informal labour 
market was not regulated by the law. Contractual provisions and rules of collective 
agreements were not applied at this market either. Dual nature of labour market resulted in 
an enormous increase of obligations related to unpaid salaries to registered workers in the 
state or majority state owned companies that were subject to privatization. Direct 
consequence of this problem was reduction of the value of the state capital due to 
accumulated losses arising out of costs growing faster than revenues.  
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Table 10 









Republic of Srpska 
- In thousands 









I  Employment 
   1. Total  999.5  551.3  448.2 
 







     - primary sectors*    21.0    11.0    10.0 
     - secondary sectors*  247.0  156.0    92.0 
     - tertiary sectors*  359.0  241.0  118.0 
 
















III  Activity rates  (in %) 
1.Rate of employment  40.1  36.7  45.5 
2.Rate of unemployment   16.4  16.9  15.8 
3. Labour force participation  48.0  44.2  54.0 
Note (*) - the number of persons employed in formal sector listed under "agriculture" covers agriculture, forestry and fishing 
industry; the manufacturing sector covers mining industry, processing industries, production and distribution of electrical power, 
gas supply, water supply and civil engineering; the service sector covers trade, catering, transport and telecommunications, 
financial services, business services, education, health, public administration and other services. 
Source: Survey of living standard in BiH households, 2001, FBiH Statistical Yearbook, 2001, BiH Statistical Agency, Federation 
Statistical Office, RS Statistics Institute; 
 
The emergence of the informal market was partly related to the high fiscal burden on 
labour. Aggregate rate of taxes and contributions on net salaries until August 2000 
amounted to 81% (average rate for both entities), and was subsequently reduced twice to 
68% (income tax rate has been reduced from 15% to only 5%). Compared with other 
countries, the total tax burden on net salaries does not exceed international average. 
However, the existence of dual ownership and uneven application of tax and labour 
legislation created a possibility for the development of a large informal market. Tax evasion 
and non-payment of social insurance contributions, as well as non-registration of workers, 
are particularly evident in the small enterprise sector. Since these companies account for 
the biggest share of the total of registered companies (over 75%), financial inspections are 
not in a position to control it adequately.  
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5  Current status of reforms  
Since mid 2002 the office of the High Representative, in co-operation with local authorities 
and international experts, has stepped up efforts to deepen the reforms focusing on fiscal 
system, business environment and judicial reform. Reform of the tax system focuses on 
the elimination of tax competition between the entities, introduction of value added tax and 
the establishment of a Unified Customs Administration for BiH. In mid 2003, a draft Law on 
Indirect Taxation was proposed, aimed at changing the fiscal structure, i.e. to grant 
considerably larger competencies to the state level authorities in collection and transfer of 
customs duties and value added tax. Given the fact that introduction of value added tax is 
foreseen for the beginning of 2005, as an interim measure for addressing the weaknesses 
related to tax collection, the Law on Turnover Tax on Goods and Services was amended, 
thus enabling collection of turnover tax at the stage of import, or production, instead of 
collection at the stage of final consumption. 
 
As far as the BiH fiscal system is concerned, preparations for the Law on Income Tax, 
which has not been applied during the entire post-war period, are also underway. Adoption 
of this Law is foreseen for the beginning of 2004, and  its application will introduce 
progressive taxation in accordance with the levels of generated income. Parallel to the 
preparation of this Law, Amendments to the Law on Corporate Tax are being prepared. 
They are aimed at reducing the existing 30% rate in FBiH to the RS level of profit tax rate 
of 10%. However, the announced amendments to this Law imply that tax exemptions will 
be far less frequent in comparison with the regulations that have been applied over the 
past 8 years. 
 
A particular effort has been put towards reforms aimed at removing administrative barriers 
to business. A commission was established at the end of November 2002 charged with 
proposing measures, which would improve business environment such as the removal of 
unnecessary legal provisions that imply lengthy and complicated procedures delaying the 
registration of business. In the period between November 2002 and the end of February 
2003, Parliaments of both entities received 50 requests for amendments to the laws that, 
according to the opinion of employers, represented a barrier to business development. 
These amendments were mainly adopted under the fast track procedure, and their result 
was a partial acceleration of the company registration process. Another important peace of 
legislation t he Law on Bankruptcy finally came into force in the Federation in 2003, 
following strong resistance by the local parties including the trade unions. The Trade 
unions demanded that privatization be reviewed in order to cushion the expected impact of 
the bankruptcy law.  
 
As far as the financial sector is concerned, amendments to the Law on Banks made in both 
entities in 2003 reinforced financial supervision, i.e. introduced stricter procedures of 
classification of commercial banks' assets with the aim of improving risk management. The 33 
proposal by the CBBiH to place the entity banking agencies under the auspices of CBBiH, 
and to make them more resilient to fend off potential pressures by entity authorities, was 
not accepted. The proposal of CBBiH governor to have CBBiH as an issuer of certificates 
on deposit was not accepted either. This proposal was a logical step toward expanded role 
of this institution and a contribution to initial development of money market in BiH. Interest 
of commercial banks in investment in foreign securities, aimed at protection against risk, 
would be at least partly compensated by introduction of first-class domestic securities. This 
proposal remains as an option and, most probably, will soon be again put on the agenda.  
 
Privatization of strategic enterprises is the most important issue in the area of privatization. 
International experts in co-operation with local experts employed in the entity privatization 
agencies have drawn a list of strategic enterprises awaiting privatization. During 
September and October 2003, tenders were opened for several enterprises from this list. 
Another burning issue is that of the reform of corporate management in public enterprises, 
primarily in energy sector and telecommunications. There are three enterprises in each of 
these two sectors. As BiH is one of the rare countries in SEE region that has a positive 
energy balance, it makes investments in energy production and distribution sector more 
attractive, and, likewise, increases the interest of foreign investors. The situation is similar 
in the field of telecom-operators, which have significantly upgraded their technology in the 




6  Current situation and prospects of BiH economy  
By the end of 2002, BiH economy reached 51,2% of its 1991 GDP, or 59,5% in per capita 
terms. In order to understand the effects of the reforms and complexity of transition in BiH, 
it is necessary to bare in mind that in 1991, the direct or indirect share of military industry 
amounted to approximately 20% of GDP. If we exclude military industry, and look at the 
civilian sector only, then the GDP in 2002 would amount to 62,5% of the 1991 level.  
 
At the beginning of 2003, the World Bank published, for the first time, the data on GNP 
(Gross National Product) for BiH expressed in USD, based on purchasing power parity 
(USD PPP).
13 In the country ranking produced by the World Bank, BiH ranks 92 out of the 
total of 208 countries. Our analysis of BiH position in the context of SEE region (including 
Slovenia), which was based on the World Bank data and statistical addendum to the study 
made by Angus Maddison, indicates that BiH made a progress in SEE region, in particular 
during 1998-2001. This analysis was derived using wealth coefficient, defined as the ratio 
between participation of a country in the global GDP, and its participation in the world's 
population. According to the wealth coefficient BiH, ranks third, after Slovenia and Croatia. 
                                                                 
13   The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, Washington, April 2003, p. 14. 34 
Table 11 
BiH: Gross domestic product - total and per capita 
  GDP (millions of USD)  GDP/PC (USD) 
 
1991   9.725  2.210 
1995  2.029  615 
1996  2.778  830 
1997  3.773  1.075 
1998  4.245  1.180 
1999  4.548  1.246 
2000  4.370  1.164 
2001  4.750  1.265 
2002  5.025  1.315 
Source: BiH Agency for Statistics, Statistical Bulletin 4/2001; Central Bank BH, Bulletin 2/2003.  
 
Table 12 
Wealth coefficients of SEE countries in 2001 
calculated on the basis of GNP in USD PPP 2001 
 




     




USD PPP  
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Albania  12  0,027  3,2  0,052  0,519 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  25  0,055  3,7  0,060  0,917 
Bulgaria    54  0,120  8,0  0,131  0,916 
Croatia  39  0,086  4,5  0,073  1,178 
Macedonia FYR  12  0,027  2,0  0,033  0,818 
Romania  130  0,288  22,4  0,365  0,789 
Slovenia  34  0,075  2,0  0,033  2,273 
Serbia and Montenegro  56  0,123  10,2  0,167  0,737 
 
























Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, IBRD/WB, Washington, 2003, pp.38-40; 190-192; calculation of 
participation and wealth coefficients are made by  Dr F. Cauševic. 
 
For the purpose of comparing the position of BiH economy in the previous years, we have 
also calculated wealth coefficients for 1990 and 1998 (see tables in the annex). 
Assessment of the position of BiH in these two years was based on GDP expressed in 
1990 international dollars (Geary-Khamis). Comparison of wealth coefficients indicates a 35 
continuous relative progress of BiH economy, that is progress as compared to the 
developments in other countries of SEE region (including Slovenia). 
 
Table 13 
Rankings of the countries in transition  
according to the achieved level of the wealth coefficient, 1990 to 2001 
  2001  1998  1990 
Slovenia  1  1  1 
Croatia  2  2  2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  3  6  5 
Bulgaria  4  3  3 
Macedonia FYR  5  5  6 
Romania  6  4  7 
Serbia and Montenegro  7  7  4 
Albania  8  8  8 
Source: F. Causevic's calculations based on: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, Washington, 2003; and 
Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, OECD, 2001 
 
However, the high-ranking position of BiH in 2001 was calculated based on GDP 
expressed in USD in PPP. The World Bank assessed that GDP expressed in terms of PPP 
was 5,2 times higher than the GDP expressed in absolute dollars. However, BiH wealth 
coefficient calculated in absolute dollars GDP places BiH on the next-to-the-last position in 
the same year: 
 
Table 14 
Wealth coefficients in SEE countries in 2001 
 




     






Share in the 
world in % 
 
Millions  
Share in the 




(share in GDP / 
share in number of 
population) 
Albania  4,1  0,013  3,2  0,052  0,250 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  4,8  0,015  3,7  0,060  0,250 
Bulgaria    13,6  0,044  8,0  0,131  0,336 
Croatia   20,3  0,065  4,5  0,073  0,890 
Macedonia  3,4  0,011  2,0  0,033  0,333 
Romania  38,7  0,124  22,4  0,365  0,340 
Slovenia  18,8  0,060  2,0  0,033  1,818 













Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, IBRD/WB, Washington, 2003, pp.38-40; 190-192; calculation of 
participation and wealth coefficients of economies are made by Dr F.Cauševic 36 
In deciding on the coefficient of 5,2 for calculating GDP in PPP the World Bank assumed 
large share of informal labour market (approximately 40%). However, in order to assess 
the sustainability of macroeconomic trends and competitiveness of BiH business sector, it 
is important to emphasize an extremely negative influence of the informal economy on 
sustaining the competitiveness of the formal sector, as well as of the system of social 
protection.  
 
Research on BiH competitiveness
14 indicates following positive sides of BiH economy: 
moderately low tax rates, macroeconomic stability achieved primarily in the monetary 
system, openness, commercial banking sector reform, and increasing quality of services in 
fixed and mobile telephone networks. 
 
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNTRY AND GOVERNMENT  
 
1.  Growth of GDP per capita in USD PPP   
2.  Tax rate on total income of citizens  
3.  Corporate tax rate  
4.  Average turnover tax rate  
5.  Pension indicator - average pension in relation to GDP/pc 
  
 I N F R A S T R U C T U R E 
 
6. Density of telephone lines - fixed telephone network 
7. Density of telephone lines - mobile telephone network  
Source: Competitiveness Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002, Faculty of Economics-MIT Centre and Academy of Sciences 
and Arts of BH, Sarajevo, October 2003 
 
However, the negative elements undermining competitiveness of BiH economy are far 
more prevalent. Despite the fact that the tax rates in BiH are relatively low, the tax system 
is inefficient and opened for misuse. The tax system in force in 1995- 2002 directly 
contributed to tax evasion and the creation of large grey market. 
 
                                                                 
14   Competitiveness Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002, Faculty of Economics-MIT Centre and Academy of Sciences 
and Arts of BH, Sarajevo, October 2003. 37 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY  
 
1. Administrative regulations in the country  
2. Structure of public consumption  
3. Independence of civil servants  
4. Tax system in the country  
5. Tax evasion 
6. Illegal additional payments / bribe 
7. GDP per capita in USD (absolute value of USD) 
8. Total public expenditures - in % of GDP 
 
I N S T I T U T I O N S  
9. Institutional stability  
10. Illegal additional payments  
11. Independence of judiciary 
12. Costs of bringing legal action  
13. Reliable legal framework  
14. Business sector can rely on efficient police protection  
15. Problem of organized crime  
16. Confidence of the public in independence of politicians  
17. Grey economy - evasion of fiscal obligations  
 
COMPANY OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIES  
18. Competitive advantages of domestic enterprises at international market  
19. Development level of exporting enterprises  
20. Export orientated enterprises that develop their own brands 
21. Procurement of new technologies  
22. Product designing  
23. Production processes in the country  
24. Marketing development level  
25. Orientation toward customers 
26. International distribution and marketing  
27. Export to neighbouring countries  
28. Export enterprises export to all international markets  
29. Approach to human resources  
30. Competence of main managerial structures  
Source: Competitiveness Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002, Faculty of Economics-MIT Centre and Academy of Sciences 
and Arts of BiH, Sarajevo, October 2003 
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Prospects of BiH achieving sustainable growth depend critically on the success of re-
integrating its economy. This presupposes economic co-operation of BiH enterprises, 
which has according to the Competitiveness report been poor so far. The approach to 
reforms between 1995-2000, and partly in the last two years, was grounded in the belief 
that the formally applied principles of free market economy and entrepreneurship would be 
sufficient to engender integration of administratively divided country. The consequence of 
this approach was that the administrative system of BiH was repeatedly misused at the 
local level, contributing to the creation of parallel systems and widespread influence of 
informal economy, and to a large extent criminal economy.  
 
 BiH represents a complex mixture of building simultaneously constitutional structure and 
political institutions as defined by the terms of the Dayton peace agreement along with 
efforts to transform its economy. This has created many contradictions, for which solutions 
have been difficult to come about. For example, strengthening central state institutions 
requires additional funding but at the same time the public sector reforms require reduction 
in public spending. The constitutional set up dividing BiH into highly autonomous regions 
has been a constraint to policy making and international community has been instrumental 
in maintaining the reform momentum. It has dominated the policy process across a wide 
range of areas. However, while it has been able to set the agenda and influence to some 
extent the dynamics of the legislative process underpinning the reforms it has had much 
less leverage on their actual implementation. Genuine consensus among the local political 
elites on the shape and the pace of reforms is lacking as it requires political compromise, 
which even at this stage is often only possible thanks to international mediation and 
sometimes outright coercion. The public perceives the government as corrupt and 
incapable, and given economic hardship of the post- war economy there, is a strong 
opposition to the reforms among some sections of the population, e.g. workers in 
manufacturing, pensioners and war veterans. BiH lacks mechanisms to ensure that the 
legislation on various aspects of reforms is implemented consistently through the state. It 
also lacks human potential and necessary expertise as well as financial means to carry out 
reforms in a comprehensive manner. The confluence of these factors has caused the 
reform process to progress in a sporadic fashion and overall very slowly. Economic 
performance has suffered as a result; price stability being the main achievement aside, 
there remain serious imbalances on the foreign account and in public finance, large 
unemployment and slow recovery of production capacity. A major challenge regarding the 
implementation of remaining structural reforms is ahead in a situation when growth 
sustenance is still dependent on international assistance and BiH's ability to raise 





A N N E X 
Table 1 
Wealth coefficients of SEE countries, 1990 
(on the basis of GDP international dollars (Geary-Khamis dollars)) 
 








 of internat. 
dollars 1990 












Albania  8,1  0,030  3,3  0,063  0,476 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  16,5  0,061  4,4  0,084  0,726 
Bulgaria    49,8  0,184  9,0  0,171  1,076 
Croatia  33,1  0,122  4,8  0,091  1,341 
Macedonia, FYR  7,4  0,027  2,0  0,038  0,711 
Romania  80,3  0,297  22,8  0,434  0,684 
Slovenia  21,6  0,080  2,0  0,038  2,105 


























Source: F.Causevic's calculations based on: Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, OECD, 2001 
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Table 2 
Wealth coefficients of SEE countries, 1998 
(on the basis of  GDP international dollars 1990 (Geary-Khamis dollars)) 
 








 of internat. 
Dollars 1990 












Albania  8,0  0,024  3,3  0,056  0,429 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  9,3  0,028  3,4  0,058  0,483 
Bulgaria    38,7  0,115  8,2  0,139  0,827 
Croatia  27,9  0,083  4,7  0,080  1,038 
Macedonia, FYR  5,9  0,017  2,0  0,034  0,500 
Romania  64,7  0,192  22,4  0,379  0,507 
Slovenia  23,6  0,070  2,0  0,034  2,059 
Serbia and Montenegro  28,7  0,085  10,5  0,178  0,478 
 
TOTAL 























Source: F. Causevic's calculations based on: Maddison, Angus, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, OECD, 2001 
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Table 3 











Slovenia  1  1  1 
Czech Republic  2  3  4 
Hungary  3  6  12 
Slovakia  4  4  7 
Poland  5  5  18 
Estonia  6  2  2 
Croatia  7  8  11 
Lithuania  8  9  5 
Belarus  9  10  10 
Latvia  10  7  3 
Russian Federation  11  13  6 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  12  19  21 
Bulgaria  13  12  16 
Kazakhstan  14  11  9 
Macedonia FYR  15  17  22 
Romania  16  16  25 
Serbia and Montenegro  17  20  17 
Ukraine  18  22  15 
Turkmenistan  19  26  23 
Albania  20  23  27 
Azerbaijan  21  24  19 
Georgia  22  18  8 
Armenia  23  14  13 
Kyrgyz Republic  24  25  24 
Uzbekistan  25  15  20 
Moldova  26  21  14 
Tajikistan  27  27  26 
Source: F. Causevic's calculations based on: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, Washington, 2003; and 




Transition indicators for selected SEE countries 
  BiH  Albania  FYR Macedonia  Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Price liberalization  3        3              3          3 
Trade and foreign exchange  3        4+              4          3+ 
Competition policy  1        2-              2          1 
Large scale privatization  2+        2+              3          2 
Small scale privatization  3        4              4          3 
Governance & en. restructuring  2-        2              2+          2 
Banking reform  2+        2+              3          2+ 
Nob- bank financial institutions  2-        2-              2-          2- 
1 indicates little or no progress in reforms; 4+ standards of functioning market economy 
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